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UNTANGLING THE MYSTERY OF TEACHING BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
SUSAN PACE HAMILL* 
A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops.** 
I.  HOW I DISCOVERED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES 
TEACHING IT 
Twenty years ago in the spring of 1995, as a new Assistant Professor of 
Law at the University of Alabama, I eagerly started teaching Business 
Organizations even though at that time my professional reputation and 
expertise was solely in the tax area, especially partnership tax. The path that 
led to my teaching Business Organizations started in 1989 when I published a 
major article on the then brand new limited liability company (LLC)1 and 
continued during the first half of the 1990s when I participated in the 
development of LLCs. I realized that in order to understand the true potential 
of LLCs I needed to diversify into business law, so I told the appointments 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law and Honors Professor, University of 
Alabama Honors College. I acknowledge the support of the University of Alabama Law School 
Foundation and the staff at the Bounds Law Library at the University of Alabama. I especially 
thank Dean Mark Brandon at the Law School and Dean Shane Sharpe at the Honors College for 
their collegial support and fine examples they have shown me as to what a teacher and a mentor 
should be. Finally I am eternally grateful to my students, numbering over two thousand, for 
providing me the opportunity to develop as a teacher. 
** FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 535 (John Bartlett & Justin Kaplan eds., 16th ed. 1992) (quoting 
HENRY BROOKS ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (1907)). In the fall of 2000 during 
my first sabbatical, Dean Timothy George of the Beeson Divinity School, a very prominent figure 
in evangelical circles who at that time was my teacher, said on the first day of class, “Someday, I 
will only be remembered as one of your teachers,” and then said Thomas Aquinas, who became 
one of the world’s most influential theologians, was ridiculed at school. Aquinas’ teacher, who at 
that time was very influential, proclaimed, “You call him the dumb ox, but in his teaching he will 
one day produce such a bellowing that it will be heard throughout the world.” ELEONORE STUMP, 
AQUINAS 3 (2003). I tell my students this story on the first day of class and remind myself that 
the opportunity to touch their lives is both an awesome privilege and a serious responsibility. 
 1. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing 
Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989) [hereinafter Hamill, A Possible Choice]. 
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committees when I interviewed for a law professor position that I wanted to 
teach Business Organizations.2 
I quickly discovered that a paradox within the law of business 
organizations created pedagogical issues and made the material more 
challenging for my students to comprehend. This quintessential example of 
interstate commerce is principally a function of state law. The power of the 
states to legitimize business organizations has saddled us with fifty state 
statutes (and decisions from fifty state courts) for multiple business 
organization forms, the major ones being corporations (which can span the 
universe of a single shareholder, a closely held group of shareholders, many 
shareholders, or millions or even billions of publicly traded shares 
outstanding), partnerships (including LLPs), limited partnerships (including 
LLLPs), and LLCs. In addition to state law, students must also navigate the 
federal securities laws, which regulate business in certain situations where state 
law proved to be ineffective. 
In order to improve my performance in the classroom, I dedicated a chunk 
of my scholarship to discover how and why the states gained the principal 
power over the law of business organizations and what similarities and 
differences truly exist among the different statutory forms.3 In class I use the 
 
 2. In my second year of law school I became a dyed-in-the-wool tax convert after earning 
the highest grade in the basic income tax class. After completing a LL.M in taxation from New 
York University, I practiced tax law with the New York City law firms of Sullivan & Cromwell 
and Chadbourne & Parke and published my first law review article. See Hamill, A Possible 
Choice, supra note 1. I joined the Passthroughs Division in the Office of Chief Counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Service in 1990. While at the IRS, in addition to advising state drafting 
committees on how to ensure their LLC statutes complied with the partnership classification 
regulations in effect at that time, I was the principal author of the partnership tax regulations 
addressing the allocation of partnership income and losses attributable to nonrecourse debt. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704–2 (2009). 
 3. See Mitchel Hampton Boles & Susan Pace Hamill, Agency Powers and Fiduciary Duties 
Under the Alabama Limited Liability Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform, 48 ALA. L. 
REV. 143 (1996); Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation From Alabama 
Limited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909 (1998); Susan 
Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study 
of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81 (1999) [hereinafter Hamill, From Special Privilege]; 
Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate 
Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the 
Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459 (1998) [hereinafter Hamill, Origins]; Susan 
Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed Business Tax 
Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Hamill, Story]; Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability 
Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification 
Regulations, 73 WASH U. L.Q. 565 (1995) [hereinafter Hamill, Partnership Classification 
Regulation]; Fallany O. Stover & Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice 
for Businesses Contemplating the Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813 (1999). 
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historical evolution of business organizations as a map to plot the order in 
which I cover the material. I believe this helps demystify what appears on the 
surface to be a disorganized mess of random statutes and cases. Also, because 
the jobs available for students have declined in large law firms that typically 
represent big business, I more heavily emphasize small business in order to 
empower students to represent this type of client immediately after graduation. 
A. A Word on Books and Materials and Getting Started 
I use Charles R.T. O’Kelley and Robert B. Thompson’s casebook because 
the authors cover partnerships, corporations, closely held corporations, and 
LLCs in different chapters in a way that best fits the order and emphasis I have 
chosen.4 I do not use a standard statutory supplement. Instead, I provide 
students a copy of Alabama’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Alabama’s 
Business Corporation Act (which is based on the Model Act), and Alabama’s 
Limited Liability Company Law as broadly representing any state’s statute. 
The casebook (either in principal cases or the notes) identifies materially 
important differences in Delaware’s and other states’ statutes and common 
law, rendering it unnecessary to include statutory provisions from multiple 
states. I also provide students materials containing excerpts of selected law 
review articles. 
I do not give students a reading assignment for the first day of class. Over 
the years I discovered that for various reasons (some legitimate, some less so) 
many students failed to complete the assignment, while others joining us late 
during the add-drop period were disadvantaged. Instead, I use the first day to 
build trust and rapport with the students. I provide an overview of my 
background and scholarship in both the business and tax areas. Also, I explain 
that I am aware of the job market and why I believe developing well-rounded 
knowledge to competently advise small businesses (which requires them at a 
minimum to also take the Personal Income Tax and the Business Tax classes) 
provides them a set of skills to build a client base if they hang out a shingle on 
their own. 
I discuss class preparation. My syllabus has five units, identified by 
numbers, and each unit has sub-units, identified by alphabetical letters with 
assigned readings. I bold the most important statutory provisions, and students 
have told me that they appreciate that. I advise the students to read the entire 
sub-unit as a unified whole even if it will take me more than one class period 
to cover it. I also tell them that in many ways the units stand alone, meaning 
after I have finished the unit they can outline it to prepare for the final exam. I 
 
 4. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2014). 
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strongly urge them to outline as we go and not wait until the end of the course 
to get started. 
Finally, on the first day, I illustrate the law school curricula’s core classes 
and where Business Organizations fits in. I include examples of electives only 
in the core business and tax areas. Many students have told me this 
presentation helped them retain the material because it put the law of business 
organizations in a deeper context than merely a set of principles and rules to be 
memorized. Although business and tax professors sometimes jokingly do not 
like to admit this, Constitutional Law must be at the top of this chart because it 
is the foundation of United States law. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Criminal Law & Procedure Torts Civil Procedure Property Contracts 
 Evidence Personal Income Tax 
 Business Tax Business Organizations 
 Employment Law 
 Advanced Partnership Tax Agency & Partnership 
 Advanced Corporate Tax Securities Regulation 
 Corporate Finance 
 Business Planning & Business and Tax Seminars 
I very briefly highlight each core area and do a more extensive review of 
Contracts. I remind students that absent extreme circumstances (such as fraud, 
undue influence, unjust enrichment) the law of contracts is very unforgiving. It 
will not invalidate a contract for inadequate consideration unless the 
consideration is so small it meets the “peppercorn” test, and it will usually not 
address areas that are not bargained for or are unclear. This is important to 
emphasize because in various ways the law of business organizations 
sometimes does both of those things. 
Then I establish this link and remind students of this link throughout the 
course—Business Organizations at its core is an extension of the law of 
contracts. When economic relationships became too complicated and lengthy, 
the law of business organizations (both the state statutes and state common 
law) evolved to fill gaps that the law of contracts by itself could not adequately 
address. 
I ask students to read DisneyWar5 by the time we start Unit Two. This 
narrative nonfiction book, in a literary fashion, tells the story of the birth, rise, 
and turmoil of one of the most famous and beloved public corporations, Walt 
Disney Company, emphasizing the twenty-year tenure of Michael Eisner as 
 
 5. See JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR (2005). 
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Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board.6 In order to add some 
picturesque color to the material, when I cover the traditional corporation 
modeled for big business in Units Two and Three, I assign selected pages of 
DisneyWar and I refer to those parts of the story in class. 
B. A Big Picture of the Class 
On the second day of class, I start Unit One, “Introduction to the Firm and 
the General Partnership,” and cover the assigned readings for Sub-Unit A, 
“Economic and Legal Concerns & Overview of the Types of Business 
Organizations.” On the board, I put the diagram pictured below that illustrates 
a continuum of the major forms of business organizations, which loosely 
corresponds to their size. 
Closely Held Corporations Widely-Held Corporations Publicly Traded Corporations 
TAXED AS A C CORPORATION OR A  TAXED AS A CORPORATION UNDER SUBCHAPTER C 
SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION 
UNDER SUBCHAPTER S Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships & LLLPs 
 Publicly Traded LLCs 
 
General Partnerships Limited Partnerships 
LLPs LLCs LLLPs 
TAXED AS A PARTNERSHIP UNDER SUBCHAPTER K 
All of the business organizations on this chart, except for general 
partnerships, require a formal filing with the particular state the owners choose 
to organize in.7 Once such a filing is made, the state statute for the particular 
business organization chosen outlines the legal relationships.8 I tell the students 
that these business organizations offer limited liability protection, meaning the 
debts of the business are not automatically attributed to the owners. The 
general partnership, which I call “the granddaddy” of business organizations 
 
 6. Id. at 1–4. See also id. at 521–23 (describing Eisner being deposed as chairman and 
preparing to resign as chief executive officer after nearly twenty years at Disney). See also 
Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime? DisneyWar, Executive Compensation, 
Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2007) 
(“DisneyWar tells the story of the corporation during the long tenure of the company’s former 
chairman and chief executive officer, Michael Eisner.”). 
 7. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(b) (1997) (associations formed under other 
statutes are not partnerships). 
 8.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10A-2-1.01(b) (2010) (corporate statute applies if entity is 
incorporated under procedures); id. § 10A-5A-1.01 (2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (LLC statute 
applies for entities formed as LLCs). 
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because it is the oldest and simplest form, automatically deems all general 
partners jointly and severally personally liable for the debts of the business.9 
I then introduce the concept of default and immutable statutory provisions. 
Default provisions define the owners’ legal relationship if they fail to spell it 
out in a contract, but the owners have flexibility to contract around the default 
provisions (for example, defining how they will share profits).10 For immutable 
provisions (of which there are very few), the law of business organizations 
trumps a contractual agreement that otherwise would be enforceable if only the 
law of contracts applied.11 I use a “Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire” dancing 
metaphor to describe how the law of contracts and the law of business 
organizations operate together. Usually the contract will prevail (Fred dancing 
forward). But, if no contract exists then the default provisions apply, and in 
immutable situations the law of business organizations overrules any contrary 
contractual agreement (Ginger dancing backwards in high heels). 
At this juncture I point out the significance of the line separating 
incorporated from most unincorporated business organizations. The line in the 
middle of my picture delineates the significant tax differences between 
corporations and unincorporated business organizations. Corporations, whether 
they are very small with only one or a few shareholders or are publicly traded, 
are taxed as a separate entity resulting in the same income being taxed twice: 
once to the corporation and a second time to the shareholders if they receive a 
return on their investment in the form of dividends.12 
Many smaller corporations can and do elect subchapter S, which largely 
mitigates the double tax but contains certain significant limitations.13 
Unincorporated business organizations (any business organization that has not 
been organized as a state-law corporation) are taxed as partnerships unless they 
are publicly traded.14 I describe the partnership tax rules as one level of tax at 
the owner level without the limitations of subchapter S—the fair-haired child 
of the business tax world. 
Without getting into any more detail (they have to take Business Tax for 
that), I believe it is important to briefly highlight the basic tax distinctions and 
 
 9. In this introduction, I tell the students I will cover the unincorporated business 
organizations, which are not general partnerships, in Unit Five. 
 10. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 49–50. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 295–96. 
 13. Id. at 295. 
 14. See id. at 312–13 (describing 1987 legislation taxing all publicly traded partnerships as 
corporations, thereby preventing LLCs from eroding the corporate tax paid by publicly traded 
corporations); Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1483 (describing regulations, dubbed the “Check-
the-Box” regulations, finalized in 1996 that automatically tax all non-publicly-traded 
unincorporated business organizations as partnerships unless the owners elect for the entity to be 
taxed as a corporation). 
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return to them in key parts of the course where they are relevant. The students 
cannot understand how and why LLCs (and a few years later LLPs and LLLPs) 
came into existence without being sensitive to the cursory tax distinctions. I 
conclude with a walk-through of the syllabus and briefly touch on what we will 
cover the entire semester. This Article provides a more expanded discussion of 
the introduction of each unit and their sub-units. 
C. The Rest of Unit One: The General Partnership 
For years I toyed with the order I should cover the rest of this unit. 
Initially, I started by defining what caused a general partnership to materialize 
and then moved on to the law of agency and the automatic agency relationship 
between the partners. I decided to reverse this order because the law of agency 
applies to many more legal relationships beyond general partners and 
introduces the anchor concept of fiduciary duty. Also, starting with the law of 
agency offers the students familiar material that helps ease them into the 
course. Agency law, having been first developed under common law and 
subsequently codified in the Restatement of Agency, resembles the evolution of 
general partnership law, which was also first developed under common law 
and subsequently codified by the Uniform Partnership Act.15 Moreover, many 
students encountered Restatements in their first year contracts class. 
For Sub-Unit B, “The Law of Agency & the Agency Relationship of 
Partners,” I start with the common example of a real estate agent selling a 
house to make the point that in many situations contracts establish and define 
the principal/agent relationship. I point out that under employment law, 
employees are automatically agents of their employers within the scope of their 
employment. I then move on to section 301 of the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (RUPA), which deems each general partner an agent of the 
partnership within the scope of its business, thus broadly making general 
partners principals and agents of each other.16 
To introduce the fiduciary duty of loyalty, I discuss two cases, one where 
an employee breached his duty of loyalty for lining up business for himself 
before severing the employment relationship and another difficult-to-
distinguish case where the court found insufficient evidence to support a duty 
 
 15. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that “partnership rules are an 
amalgam of well-developed common law and equitable doctrines, now largely codified,” and 
referring to the first statute as the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA 1914) and the second as the 
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA 1997)). 
 16. See id. at 20–21, 131–32 (noting that RUPA § 301 makes it unnecessary to analyze each 
partner’s agency relationship). 
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of loyalty breach.17 Covering multiple cases at the same time that are difficult 
to meaningfully distinguish forces students to think more critically about the 
material. I emphasize that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is owed even though the 
principal did not bargain for it and point out that contracts that expand this 
fiduciary duty through broad non-compete clauses have a stricter standard of 
review than ordinary contracts.18 I introduce the student to the major lenses 
interpreting the duty of loyalty (and every other aspect of the law of business 
organizations)—the “fairness” approach, which requires the parties to refrain 
from self-interested behavior not specifically allowed by a contract and the 
“law and economics” approach, which approximates what they would bargain 
for if they could dicker without cost.19 
After highlighting the termination of the agency relationship in the context 
of the at-will employment doctrine, I cover the power of the agent to bind the 
principal using two cases where an agent of an investment brokerage house 
defrauded the plaintiff.20 I pull this into the realm of general partnerships by 
asking the students to assume that the rogue agent was a general partner rather 
than an employee. Either way, the doctrine of apparent authority will force the 
principal or partnership to bear the loss only if the plaintiff reasonably believed 
the rogue agent had authority.21 
Sub-Unit C, “Defining a General Partnership, Sharing Profits and Losses 
& Fiduciary Duties” takes me three class sessions to complete.22 I use two 
cases to illustrate that a general partnership materializes when sole proprietors 
by course of conduct, not through their formal intent, act as co-proprietors.23 
Once they have legally crossed over to a general partnership, in addition to 
acquiring agency power and being jointly and severally liable for the debts of 
the partnership, the partners will be subject to a number of other provisions in 
 
 17. See id. at 20–28 (covering Cmty. Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239 (4 th 
Cir. 1963) and Hamburger v. Hamburger, No. 93-3359-E, 1995 WL 579679 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 29, 1995)). 
 18. See id. at 28 (covering Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982)). 
 19. See id. at 20–28 (covering Cmty. Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239 (4th 
Cir. 1963) and Hamburger v. Hamburger, No. 93-3359-E, 1995 WL 579679 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 29, 1995)). 
 20. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 29–48 (covering Foley v. Interactive Data 
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Blackburn v. Witter, 19 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962); and 
Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
 21. See id. I conclude this sub-unit with a case illustrating that a partner who exceeds his 
actual authority is liable for breach of contract to the other partners. Id. at 136–37 (covering 
Haymond v. Lundy, No. 99-5048, 2002 WL 1972101 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2002)). 
 22. Our curriculum allocates only three hours to Business Organizations. My class meets 
twice a week for seventy-five minutes rather than three times a week for fifty minutes. 
 23. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 54–63 (covering Byker v. Mannes, 641 
N.W.2d 210 (Mich. 2002) and Hynansky v. Vietri, No. 14645-NC, 2003 WL 21976031 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 7, 2003)). 
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the statute that automatically apply unless they agree otherwise, which can be 
an oral agreement.24 
Under the default provision, unless they agree otherwise, they share profits 
equally and the profit share constitutes the sole compensation for partners who 
primarily contribute services.25 If the partners fail to agree on how they bear 
losses the statutory default provides that they bear losses in the same ratio they 
share profits.26 That can result in inequitable consequences if some partners 
contribute mostly services while others contribute mostly capital. I identify 
Kovacik v. Reed, in which the California Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court’s order that the service contributor bear half of the capital contributor’s 
losses, as an example of a “fairness” interpretation of the law.27 
I identify another case in the notes as well as the comments in the RUPA 
that do not recognize the equitable remedy articulated in Kovacik as examples 
of a “law and economics” interpretation of the law.28 While recognizing that 
“[i]t may seem unfair that the contributor of services, who contributes little or 
no capital, should be obligated to contribute toward the capital loss of the large 
contributor who contributed no services,” the comments insist that partners 
desiring a different result should “take advantage of their power to vary by 
agreement the allocation of capital losses.”29 Such an agreement would require 
the capital contributor to bear all losses but also must require income to first 
restore those losses before being split according to the profit share.30 
I launch a discussion of the fiduciary duty of loyalty general partners owe 
each other with Meinhard v. Salmon, one of Judge Cardozo’s most famous 
opinions.31 I juxtapose Cardozo’s majority opinion as “fairness” leaning with 
Judge Andrews’s dissent as “law and economics” leaning before moving on to 
 
 24. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(7) (1997) (stating explicitly that oral agreements are 
effective). I also tell the students it is always bad business planning to rely on oral agreements and 
that closely held corporations require agreements to be in writing, which we will explore in Unit 
Four. 
 25. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 69–72 (covering Shamloo v. Ladd, No. 
B154201, 2003 WL 68054 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 26. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b). 
 27. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 67–68 (covering Kovacik v. Reed, 315 
P.2d 314 (Cal. 1957)). 
 28. Id. at 72; REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 cmt. 3. 
 29. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 cmt. 3. See also ALA. CODE § 10A-8-4.01(b) (2010). 
Given the informal nature of general partnerships I ask the students whether it is reasonable to 
assume many general partners would think to enter into such an agreement. 
 30. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) cmt. 3 (discussing ways in which the income 
and losses must be distributed among the partners, even when the partners have entered into an 
agreement). 
 31. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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other cases exploring the contours of fiduciary duties among general partners.32 
I walk through the statute defining the limited ability to contract around 
fiduciary duties, and refer to a case where a court refused to enforce a 
contractual agreement giving a committee absolute discretion to allocate 
profits among all the partners when they inequitably divided the profits.33 
Most students find the material of Sub-Unit D, “Dissociation, Dissolution 
& Expulsion” to be the most difficult in this unit. I begin by providing a 
summary of the highly dissolvable nature of partnerships governed by the 
Uniform Partnership Act and then point out that the RUPA default still triggers 
automatic dissolution if a partner withdraws from an at-will partnership, the 
scenario that accounts for a large amount of the litigated cases.34 I also strongly 
emphasize that the power to dissociate is immutable—it cannot be eliminated 
by contract.35 Then I cover the split in jurisdictions as to whether dissolutions 
that are not wrongful must result in cash liquidations or if a court is 
empowered to order a division of the assets. 
The subjects of wrongful dissociation and dissolution pose perplexing 
questions. Cases such as Page v. Page, decided under the Uniform Partnership 
Act, recognize that it is possible for a partner to use his power to withdraw 
from an at-will partnership in a manner that amounts to a wrongful dissolution, 
although there are contrary decisions.36 The RUPA did not resolve this split. 
 
 32. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 73–88 (covering Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Vigneau v. Storch Eng’rs, No. CV-890700122S, 1995 WL 767984 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1995); and Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)). I also 
point out that some Uniform Partnership Act jurisdictions impose no duty of care among general 
partners. Id. at 92–95 (covering Ferguson v. Williams, 670 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)). 
However, the RUPA imposes a duty of care to refrain from grossly negligent conduct, which 
cannot be unreasonably reduced by an agreement. See ALA. CODE §§ 10A-8-1.04(b)(4), -4.04(c). 
 33. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 88–92 (covering Starr v. Fordham, 648 
N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995)). I ask the students to consider whether the strict enforcement of the 
contract in Haymond v. Lundy can be meaningfully distinguished. In that case, Lundy was forced 
to subtract from his share of a contingent fee, which totaled almost $1 million, $140,000 of the 
$150,000 referral fee because the partnership agreement only authorized expenditures up to 
$10,000. Haymond v. Lundy, No. 99-5048, 2002 WL1972101, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2002). 
Docking Lundy for most of the referral fee rather than docking the partners equally meant Lundy 
was deprived of an equal share of the profit from this case even though he did all the work to 
bring it in. See id. Arguably strict enforcement of this contract inappropriately eliminates the duty 
of loyalty as it did in Starr. I speculate that perhaps Lundy’s lawyer did not argue that enforcing 
the contract under these facts inappropriately eliminated the duty of loyalty. 
 34. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 3, at 915–22. 
 35. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 104(b)(6). 
 36. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 106–15 (covering Drashner v. Sorenson, 63 
N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954); McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2004); Page v. Page, 359 
P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961); and Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979)). 
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Both the “fairness” and “law and economics” camps on the drafting committee 
preserved their arguments in the statute.37 
The expulsion of partners pursuant to a contract raises the issue as to what 
degree the duty of loyalty will overturn an otherwise enforceable contract. An 
important case, Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, recognizes that a contractual 
expulsion will not be enforced if it was invoked to usurp a partner’s rightful 
economic share of the partnership, but it refuses to recognize wrongful 
expulsions outside the economic arena.38 
D. Unit Two: The Corporation and the Shareholders 
In Unit Two, I shift to the other side of my continuum with the 
“grandmamma” corporation, the traditional corporation not involving special 
law created for close corporations, and focus on the law addressing the issues 
faced by shareholders.39 In Sub-Unit A, “Historical Development of the 
Corporation & Basic Corporate Characteristics,” I explain how state 
legislatures rather than Congress acquired the power to issue special corporate 
charters, which subsequently resulted in general incorporation laws being 
created by the states.40 Those state laws evolved in a manner that empowered 
shareholders to elect the board of directors and authorize extraordinary events 
while vesting control of the corporation’s business with the board and 
appointed officers.41 
I then move on to Sub-Unit B, “Election/Removal of Directors, Basic 
Corporate Governance and Rights to Corporate Information.” Due to time 
constraints I streamline this material’s vast detail in summary fashion. I 
emphasize only the big picture of straight and cumulative voting and the 
process of removing directors, and I contrast Delaware’s entrenchment leaning 
 
 37. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 3, at 921–22. 
 38. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 116–22 (covering Bohatch v. Butler & 
Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) (holding that an expulsion retaliating against a partner for 
fulfilling her ethical obligation as a member of the Bar to report a partner suspected of overbilling 
a client is nevertheless valid)). The dissent in Bohatch argued that such expulsions should not be 
valid because the fiduciary duties imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility should 
outweigh the contract, thus requiring the partnership to pay damages. See id. I also cover the 
fiduciary duties withdrawing partners owe when competing for clients. Id. at 122–31 (covering 
Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989)). 
 39. Over the years as LLCs joined the mainstream of business organizations, I cut coverage 
in this unit so I could expand Unit Five. The numbing details of the nuances of corporate 
governance, which are very important in corporate departments of large law firms and in-house 
counsel representing big business, are not as important for lawyers representing small businesses. 
 40. See Hamill, From Special Privilege, supra note 3, at 88, 122. 
 41. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 149–62 (summarizing characteristics of 
traditional corporations and procedures for incorporation). 
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policies with the model act.42 DisneyWar adds color to this otherwise dry 
material. The removal of Roy Disney, the nephew of Walt Disney and one of 
the largest shareholders at that time, from Disney’s board inspired a 
shareholder revolt that led to both the board stripping Michael Eisner of his 
position as Chairman of the Board and Eisner ultimately resigning as Chief 
Executive Officer.43 
I start Sub-Unit C, “The Role of Federal Law,” with the tale of Delaware 
winning the “race-to-the-bottom,” the failed movement to federalize corporate 
law in the early twentieth century, and the stock market crash of 1929, all of 
which led to the birth of the 1933 and 1934 federal securities laws.44 I cover a 
Supreme Court case that defines when an investment meets the definition of a 
“security,” briefly describe the disclosure requirements reporting companies 
and public offerings must follow, and highlight major additions to the 
securities laws in the early twenty-first century.45 I also summarize the 
regulations reporting companies must follow for proxy solicitations. Most 
students enjoy the material addressing whether the board can exclude certain 
shareholder precatory proposals or if those must be included in the proxy.46 
E. Unit Three: The Corporation and the Directors 
In Sub-Unit A, “Overview of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties & the Business 
Judgment Rule,” I discuss Shlensky v. Wrigley and Dodge v. Ford Motor 
 
 42. Id. at 162–207, 250–52 (covering Conservative Caucus v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569 
(Del. Ch. 1987)). I require the students to only skim most of this material. 
 43. See STEWART, supra note 5, at 1–4, 465–73, 491–511. See also Laura M. Holson, A 
Quiet Departure for Eisner at Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at C6 (noting that several 
Disney executives described Eisner as “leaving a job he loves before he is ready to” and the 
situation where there was “no grand send-off or congratulatory party” as “an awkward time for 
him”). 
 44. See Hamill, From Special Privilege, supra note 3, at 118–20, 171–72. Delaware 
liberalized powers accorded the board and officers and became the favorite state for big business 
after Woodrow Wilson, then the governor of New Jersey, tightened New Jersey’s general 
incorporation law in 1913 to curtail antitrust activities. Id. That inspired state legislatures all over 
the country to follow suit. Id. at 118–19. Blistering criticism of these liberal general incorporation 
laws led to proposals, all of which ultimately failed, by four presidential administrations 
(Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt) to remove corporate law from state 
jurisdiction. Id. at 119. See also id. at 121–23, 169, 172 (linking the need for the 1933 and 1934 
securities laws to the inability of the states to effectively regulate big business and concluding 
that “[t]he two-tier state and federal approach distinctive of U.S. corporation law, resulted directly 
from the states, rather than Congress, securing primary control over the corporation during the 
nineteenth century”). 
 45. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 207–49 (covering Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 
(1953); and Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 46. Id. 
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Company at the same time.47 In both cases seemingly “crackpot” decisions 
(keep the lights off at Wrigley Field and lower the price of the cars at a time 
when cars were individually crafted as toys for the rich and demand far 
exceeded supply) were immune to challenge by disgruntled shareholders 
because of the business judgment rule.48 
The first decision turned out to be unwise and eventually lights were 
installed on the field. However with a nationwide network of superhighways 
and mass production of cars in a distant future that nobody in the early 
twentieth century could have predicted, the decision to lower the price of the 
cars turned out to be brilliant. In order to make sense of the rest of this unit, 
which explores the strength of the business judgment rule and when it will be 
rebutted, students must first see the reason for it—to provide directors the 
freedom to make risky visionary decisions, many of which will flop but a few 
of which will not only result in enormous profits but will also change the 
course of history. 
I move from this broad overview to situations in which the director will 
never enjoy the business judgment rule because he or she has inappropriately 
benefitted financially at the expense of the corporation. I kick off Sub-Unit B, 
“Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine & Conflicts 
of Interest,” with two cases illustrating the corporate opportunity doctrine. One 
imposes a stronger duty of loyalty recommended by the American Law 
Institute and the other illustrates Delaware law’s more narrow interpretation.49 
I emphasize that the policy behind ALI-leaning states forces directors to 
disclose and offer all opportunities connected to the corporation’s business to 
the full board, while Delaware’s policy grants far more deference to directors, 
thus allowing them more economic freedom.50 
I start my coverage of transactions involving a conflict of interest between 
one or more board members and the corporation with some historical 
background. I think it is important for the students to see that at one time these 
transactions were not eligible to receive the business judgment rule 
presumption. Initially, they were always void or voidable even if the fairness-
 
 47. See id. at 263–80 (covering Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) 
and Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 281–304 (covering Ne. Harbor Gulf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 
1995) and Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996)). 
 50. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 281–304. Because a rejection of a corporate 
opportunity that amounts to a “waste of corporate assets” cannot be fair to the corporation and 
can never enjoy the business judgment rule, I introduce the students to corporate waste but save 
more detailed coverage for when I discuss the duty to act in good faith and the Disney cases. See 
id. at 288–89. See also infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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to-the-corporation standard was met, and later they were allowed to legally 
stand only if that standard was met.51 
I then refer to the statutory provisions of the model act (which Alabama 
follows) defining a conflict of interest and the process of ratification, which 
restores the business judgment rule. I especially focus on ratification by a 
committee of “qualified” directors.52 I conclude with a discussion as to 
whether certain members of Disney Corporation’s board should have received 
the business judgment rule presumption when they approved Michael Eisner’s 
compensation package.53 
I finish this sub-unit with an anchor case, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
which articulates the standard of review when a corporate parent engages in 
transactions with its controlled subsidiary.54 I point out to the students that this 
area is related to but not governed by the conflict of interest statute. In order 
for the business judgment rule to be rebutted, thus requiring the parent to prove 
fairness to the subsidiary, the parent must engage in “self-dealing,” meaning 
the transaction must benefit the parent to the detriment of the minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary.55 
I cover Sub-Unit C, “Fiduciary Duty of Care, Statutory Exculpation & 
Good Faith,” from an evolutionary perspective, starting with Smith v. Van 
 
 51. See id. at 304–08 (covering Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 
(N.Y. 1918)). Because Henry Ford may have been trying to thwart the Dodge brothers from 
competing with him when he refused to authorize dividends, arguably this decision could have 
been overturned on the grounds of a conflict of interest. See supra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
 52. ALA. CODE §§ 10A-2-8.60 to .63 (2010). In order to be “qualified” a director must lack 
“a familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship” with the conflicted director. Id. § 
10A-2-8.62(d). 
 53. Directors that claimed to be independent because they did not work for Disney were still 
conflicted because they had a close relationship with Eisner in other capacities. Irwin Russell, 
who chaired the compensation committee and was also Eisner’s personal lawyer, was “[t]he most 
egregious example.” See STEWART, supra note 5, at 279–80. Robert Stern, Eisner’s personal 
architect, Reveta Bowers, the principal of an early education school Eisner’s sons and children of 
other Disney executives attended, Leo O’Donovan, President of Georgetown, the school from 
which Eisner’s son graduated and the recipient of substantial donations from Disney, and George 
Mitchell, who individually and through his law firm earned substantial fees from Disney, “[w]hile 
less egregious . . . had obvious conflicts.” Id. 
 54. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 309–13 (covering Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)). 
 55. Id. Although draining Sinven’s cash through extraordinary dividends rendered Sinven 
unable to engage in further business development, it still was not considered “self-dealing” 
because Sinven’s minority shareholders received a pro rata share of the dividends. Id. If the 
conflict of interest statute technically applied, this decision would have needed to meet a fairness 
review because Sinven’s directors could not have been considered qualified or independent and 
shareholder ratification would not have been possible because only the minority shareholders of 
Sinven could have been considered disinterested. 
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Gorkom, the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case in which the business 
judgment rule was rebutted on the grounds that the directors engaged in a 
grossly negligent process (failed to perform minimal due diligence) before 
making their decision.56 I emphasize that the merits of the underlying business 
decision, recommending a proposed merger financed by a leveraged buy-out, 
were no worse than the decisions to keep the lights off the field or lower the 
price of the cars.57 
As a direct result of this decision, the Delaware legislature (followed by 
other states) amended its corporate code to allow for exculpation clauses in the 
corporation’s articles, which eliminate duty of care breaches on grounds of 
gross negligence, leaving directors only potentially liable for duty of loyalty 
breaches, bad faith decisions, and conduct that intentionally harms the 
corporation.58 I discuss the effect of an exculpatory clause using Malpiede v. 
Townson that had facts very similar to Van Gorkom but rather than facing 
liability those directors were shielded by the corporation’s exculpatory 
clause.59 I then move on to In re Caremark, which clarified the affirmative 
duty of directors to monitor and oversee the conduct of corporate employees 
deep within the hierarchy of the organizations, even if no suspicion exists that 
those employees are breaking the law or jeopardizing the corporation’s 
profits.60 
I allocate two class sessions to cover the Disney cases, which explore the 
boundaries defining when board members have acted in good faith.61 The 
proliferation of exculpation clauses in many public companies has caused the 
duty to act in good faith to effectively emerge as the minimal standard of 
fiduciary duty owed by directors. Rather than discuss the cases sequentially, I 
use key parts of DisneyWar as a guide to cover the cases at the same time. I 
believe that the story greatly helps students understand the law. 
I start off by summarizing the problem. Despite having no experience 
running a publicly traded diversified corporation, the board hired Michael 
Ovitz as president of the company.62 Ovitz had a stormy fourteen-month tenure 
 
 56. Id. at 330–51. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 349–51. 
 59. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 352–60. 
 60. See id. at 352–78 (covering Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001) and In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 61. See id. at 379–95 (covering Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt 
Disney Company Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)). 
 62. See STEWART, supra note 5, at 173 (“Coming from the world of agencies, Ovitz was 
unfamiliar with corporate hierarchies.”); id. at 200, 210 (noting that board members doubted 
whether Ovitz could adapt to corporate culture, one of them deeming Ovitz “unqualified”). 
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that ultimately failed; he was fired without cause, triggering a severance 
package that cost Disney’s shareholders $140 million.63 I highlight the 
circumstances revealed in the story surrounding the hiring of Ovitz, which 
shows that the board met the minimum standard for acting in good faith and 
therefore was entitled to the business judgment rule.64 Then I focus on the 
question whether the board acted in bad faith when they failed to fire Ovitz for 
cause. Again the story is tremendously helpful. Key parts illustrate that despite 
initially supporting the hiring of Ovitz, Eisner thwarted Ovitz at every turn, 
which deprived the board of any argument that Ovitz could be fired for 
cause.65 
Then I ask the class if the board failed to act in good faith or was guilty of 
wasting corporate assets when it approved Ovitz’s employment agreement with 
the no-fault termination provisions without informing themselves of the 
magnitude of the payout if Ovitz was fired without cause. The story illustrates 
how hasty the deal was put together—over a weekend—and how little the 
board did.66 Most of the committee members did not even know about the 
Ovitz deal until it was already done.67 I explain that the Delaware Supreme 
Court found good faith by imputing knowledge to the board as to the 
magnitude of the payout from two sources—the value of benchmark options 
previously granted to Eisner and another Disney executive and backend 
options granted to Eisner instead of a $50 million upfront bonus.68 
 
 63. Id. at 260–76. 
 64. Id. at 171 (noting that Ovitz was successful in several other capacities and was labeled 
“the most powerful individual in Hollywood” by The Wall Street Journal). See also id. at 173, 
199–200, 210–13 (explaining that although some board members had reservations, Eisner 
aggressively recruited Ovitz). I ask the students how the decision to hire Ovitz might have 
worked out if Eisner had not been in charge of Disney. See supra note 43. 
 65. See STEWART, supra note 5, at 216–19 (explaining that Eisner betrayed and undermined 
Ovitz at his first meeting with senior executives); id. at 224–25 (noting that Eisner undermined 
Ovitz behind his back); id. at 227–29 (noting that Eisner thwarted Ovitz’s efforts to bring creative 
talent to Disney); id. at 234–35 (explaining that Ovitz prevented animators and the star of “Home 
Improvement” from quitting); id. at 237–40, 328 (finding that Ovitz’s efforts to settle a 
contractual dispute with Jeffrey Katzenberg, a former Disney executive, for $90 million was 
thwarted by Eisner, resulting in a lawsuit, negative publicity, and Disney being ordered to pay 
Katzenberg $280 million). 
 66. See id. at 213 (discussing formation of the deal). 
 67. Id. at 213–14 (finding that contrary to Disney’s by-laws, neither the compensation 
committee nor the full Disney board reviewed the agreement over that weekend); id. at 222 
(noting that only three board members knew any details concerning Ovitz’s deal before it was 
approved and no board member asked any relevant questions). 
 68. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 390–94 (covering In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)) The standard for waste of corporate assets is whether 
“what the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound 
business judgment would deem it worth that which the corporation has paid.” Id. at 378 (internal 
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I ask the students if the facts in the story justify imputing this knowledge to 
the board.69 I conclude with a question not posed by the cases that ran 
throughout the story—did the board breach its duty to act in good faith by 
continuing to allow Eisner to remain Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer despite his many blunders and his deplorable leadership? In 
addition to significant losses the company incurred because of the Ovitz 
debacle, the story documents the horrors of the Eisner period at Disney, 
including the following: many disastrous business decisions and lost 
opportunities directly caused by Eisner, three of which amounted to a more 
than $1 billion mistake; Eisner’s management failures of monumental 
proportions which led to talented executives and creative artists leaving 
Disney; and, finally, “Eisner’s most glaring defect,” reckless dishonesty that 
left “a trail of deeply embittered former colleagues” all of which “had direct 
and costly business consequences for Disney.”70 
Due to time constraints I cover Sub-Unit D, “Indemnification and 
Insurance,” in a summary fashion. I go back through the cases already covered 
and ask whether indemnification is required, allowed, or not permitted. The 
 
quotation marks omitted). I ask the students to ponder whether they are convinced the magnitude 
of Ovitz’s payout avoids the threshold for amounting to corporate waste. 
 69. If the board was so ill informed about Ovitz, is it reasonable to assume it exercised any 
degree of due diligence and good faith regarding Eisner’s compensation, especially given the 
conflicts of interest and that most of them refused to stand up to Eisner? See STEWART, supra 
note 5, at 409–24 (describing governance reforms thwarted by Eisner and the removal from key 
committees and ouster of board members willing to stand up to Eisner as “leaving Eisner loyalists 
in charge of all key board positions”). 
 70. Id. at 533. See also id. at 529–34 (summarizing Eisner’s most significant business 
blunders and character flaws and noting that Eisner’s success occurred mostly in the early years 
of his tenure, which began in 1984, and the weak performance of Disney since 1995); id. at 126–
35 (noting staggering financial losses from the Euro Disney project that Eisner could have 
avoided had he paid attention to key advisors about the challenges of doing business abroad); id. 
at 192, 321–28 (explaining that Eisner’s position that Katzenberg was not entitled to bonus was 
untenable, yet Eisner stubbornly refused to settle the case, resulting in costly and embarrassing 
litigation and damages of $280 million, which could have been settled for as little as $60 million); 
id. at 376–79 (explaining that the ill-conceived acquisition of the Family channel was financially 
disastrous); id. at 161–62 (describing how Eisner flattered Katzenberg and then trashed him 
behind his back); id. at 134, 159, 161, 172, 199, 210, 214, 224, 235, 248, 256, 258, 261–62, 326, 
417–18 (noting examples of Eisner’s lies); id. at 239–40, 242 (describing how Eisner praised 
Ovitz while secretly planning to fire him); id. at 359 (finding that Eisner pitted two executives 
against each other); id. at 395–96 (describing how the Pixar deal with Steve Jobs failed because 
of Eisner’s dishonesty); id. at 366–67 (explaining that a consultant concluded Disney executives 
were highly dysfunctional and that none trusted Eisner); id. at 494–95 (noting that Institutional 
Shareholder Services recommended that shareholders vote “withhold” for Eisner) (“At the end of 
the day, all roads lead back to Eisner. For 20 years Disney’s revolving door for board members 
and management has had one constant—Mr. Eisner. The boardroom battles, and management 
departures, which pre-date the Disney/Gold campaign, are disappointing, expensive, distracting, 
and not in the best interest of shareholders.”). 
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corporation must indemnify the directors for their expenses if after going 
through the entire litigation process they were successful on the merits.71 
Directors and Officers insurance, if a policy exists, would cover these 
expenses. On the other side, if the director is adjudged liable, indemnification 
is not permitted and insurance policies will exclude the expenses and the 
liability from coverage.72 I briefly summarize how the issue of allowable 
indemnification pursuant to the corporation’s by-laws and insurance coverage, 
both which generally require the director to act in good faith, gets complicated 
when the case settles, requiring liability of some amount without the director 
acknowledging wrongdoing. 
F. Unit Four: Closely Held Corporations 
I start Sub Unit A, “Minority Shareholders Using Contracts, Special 
Fiduciary Duties & Statutory Remedies,” with the historical development of 
closely held corporations. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
individuals who acted like general partners incorporated in order to obtain 
limited liability protection from the debts of the business.73 Savvy business 
planners recognized that the majority control statutory provisions in the 
corporate statutes left minority shareholders vulnerable and created 
shareholder agreements to protect their interests.74 Although courts were 
initially hostile towards eliminating majority control, such shareholder 
agreements and voting agreements subsequently were recognized as 
enforceable contracts.75 
To illustrate the plight of minority shareholders who are not protected by a 
contract, I cover a case where the business judgment rule upheld the board’s 
decision to pay only modest dividends even though most of the profits were 
being paid out as salaries and the minority shareholder had resigned from a 
salaried position due to disagreements.76 I also point out that this scenario does 
not occur in partnerships because of the immutable right to dissociate and the 
default rule that requires unanimity to pay salaries outside of the partners’ 
profit shares. 
In order to emphasize that the common law recognizing special fiduciary 
duties among shareholders of closely held corporations is a significant 
departure from traditional corporate law, I ask the students to first to analyze 
the seminal cases of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. and Wilkes v. 
 
 71. ALA. CODE § 10A-2-8.52 (2010). 
 72. Id. § 10A-2-8.51(d)(1). 
 73. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 451–54. 
 74. Id. at 452–54. 
 75. Id. at 454–70 (covering Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) and Ramos v. 
Estrada, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 76. Id. at 470–76 (covering Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977)). 
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Springside Nursing Home, Inc. under traditional corporate law, which would 
have denied the minority shareholder relief in both cases.77 I discuss the 
common law special fiduciary duties among closely held corporate 
shareholders created in both those cases, which thematically lines up with 
“fairness” thinkers among corporate scholars; then, I contrast Delaware’s law 
as articulated in Nixon v. Blackwell, which refused to create special fiduciary 
duties and lines up with the “law and economics” thinkers among corporate 
scholars.78 I then shift to the statutory remedy for oppression offered in model-
act-leaning states and their differences with common law judicial remedies, the 
main difference being defendants have the option to buy out plaintiffs that 
invoke the statutory remedy.79 
I finish Sub-Unit A with a problem that explores the downside of 
shareholder agreements. Each person owns one third of the shares, they agree 
in writing that unanimity is required for all business actions, and they are each 
entitled to one third of the profits paid in the form of salaries. Two 
shareholders work hard and one materially slacks off and alienates the clients 
of the business. I ask the students to contemplate what remedies the two 
majority hard-working shareholders have.80 From there I transition to Sub-Unit 
B, “Share Repurchase Agreements as a Tool to Provide Liquidity,” because 
 
 77. Id. at 476–501 (covering Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 
1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); and Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993)). 
 78. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 476–501. Even if the decisions to buy back 
Mr. Rodd’s shares, not offer the same terms to Mrs. Donahue, and terminate Mr. Wilkes from a 
paid salary position and continue to not pay dividends involved a conflict of interest, those 
decisions would usually be considered fair to the corporation. Fairness to the corporation is the 
only relevant inquiry under traditional corporate law because all fiduciary duties are owed by the 
directors to the corporation—not to individual shareholders. In order to address fairness to 
minority shareholders, many states by common law created fiduciary duties among shareholders 
of closely held corporations. The particular strength of that fiduciary duty (even Massachusetts in 
Wilkes backed off from recognizing the same level of fiduciary duties general partners owe each 
other) will vary from state-to-state. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 3, at 923–25 & nn.61–65 
(discussing cases in several states and noting that Alabama requires minority shareholders to 
show a higher level of bad faith than Massachusetts). 
 79. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 501–15 (covering In re Kemp & Beatley, 
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) and Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1984)). 
 80. Id. at 516 (Problem 5–4). Removal of the lazy shareholder through a judicial proceeding 
will be difficult because they have to show “fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of 
authority or discretion.” See ALA. CODE § 10A-2-8.09 (2010). The unanimity requirement 
effectively creates deadlock so the majority could file for statutory oppression, but that would 
trigger buy-out rights for the lazy shareholder. It is possible to argue that the unanimity is being 
used in a manner that breaches a fiduciary duty, but that will be an uphill climb. See supra note 
78. I make a strong point to the students that unanimity requirements created by a shareholder 
agreement can be abused and corporate law does not adequately remedy the situation. 
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any buy-out rights for individual shareholders must be defined in a contract. I 
cover two cases where a specifically enforced share repurchase agreement 
forced a shareholder to sell back his shares at a price significantly below fair 
market value as examples illustrating that these contracts can easily be badly 
drafted.81 I emphasize that courts are reluctant to impose a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty when interpreting such contracts and that this materially differs from 
partnership law, which refuses to enforce expulsion contracts if invoked to 
deprive a partner of his or her economic share of the partnership.82 
Sub-Unit C, “Piercing the Corporate Veil,” which explores the extent to 
which third party creditors can force shareholders to pay debts technically 
owed by the corporation, completes this unit. I streamline the seemingly 
inconsistent cases involving individual shareholders by illustrating that the 
shareholder must control the corporation either outright or in collusion with 
others in his capacity as a shareholder and use that control in some fashion to 
abuse the privilege of limited liability protection.83 This is why piercing the 
corporate veil is a close corporation phenomena—corporate board members 
and officers of large corporations who commit acts that not only raise issues of 
liability to shareholders per a derivative suit but also arguably abuse the 
corporate veil cannot be held personally liable to a third party creditor because 
their control over the corporation typically comes from entrenchment under the 
corporate governance rules, not from their position as a shareholder.84 
I then show that it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of a subsidiary 
and hold a corporate parent personally liable because the parent’s control of 
the subsidiary must encompass much more than owning most or all of the 
subsidiary’s shares and having common board members and officers for both 
corporations. The Supreme Court states that the actions and decisions by the 
parent’s board abusing the subsidiary’s veil must be done in its capacity as 
acting for the parent.85 
 
 81. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 516–30 (covering Concord Auto Auction, Inc. 
v. Rustin, 627 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Mass. 1986); Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 
1989); and Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 606–32 (covering Consumer’s Co-op v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1988); 
K.C. Roofing Ctr. v. On Top Roofing, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); W. Rock Co. 
v. Davis, 432 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); and Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 
1990)). 
 85. See id. at 632–49 (covering Craig v. Lake Asbestos, 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988) and 
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1988)). Although the Supreme Court’s opinion does not 
“recite the ways . . . [that] could show that dual officers or directors were in fact acting on behalf 
of the parent,” it does indicate control of the subsidiary will be established if the action is “plainly 
contrary to the interests of the subsidiary yet nonetheless advantageous to the parent.” Id. at 643 
& n.13. I tell the students to apply the standards for “self-dealing” as articulated in Sinclair. See 
supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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G. Unit Five: Unincorporated Business Organizations Offering Limited 
Liability 
Unit Five, “Unincorporated Business Organizations Offering Limited 
Liability,” the grand finale of the course, features limited liability companies 
(LLCs), the fastest growing entity chosen for businesses that are not publicly 
traded. Sub-Unit A, “The Limited Partnership and the Emergence of LLCs, 
LLPs and LLLPs,” focuses on the stories that explain how and why the 
business landscape ended up with this confusing array of multiple 
unincorporated business organizations. I start with the limited partnership, 
which was invented in the nineteenth century as an alternative to special 
corporate charters but did not emerge as a significant business entity until the 
second half of the twentieth century.86 Limited partnerships vested control of 
the business with the general partner, who was also personally liable for the 
business’s debts. Limited partners had no statutory management rights and 
enjoyed limited liability protection as long as they remained passive investors. 
I tell the students that general partners can be viewed as performing the 
functions of both the board and officers of a corporation merged into one role 
and limited partners can be loosely compared to corporate shareholders.87 
I transition to the story of LLCs by first painting the business landscape in 
1977—the year the Wyoming legislature passed the first LLC statute, which 
created for the first time an unincorporated domestic business organization that 
provided direct limited liability protection to all owners even if they controlled 
the business.88 At that time, limited partnerships were in their heyday, being 
widely used for real estate and other development projects.89 Limited 
partnerships achieved substantive limited liability by incorporating the general 
 
 86. Hamill, From Special Privilege, supra note 3, at 172–73. 
 87. See id. at 172–74 & nn.327–32, app. D (noting that the first limited partnership statute 
was passed by New York in 1822 and by 1875 most states had limited partnership statutes). 
Limited partnerships were not a viable choice for business until the early 20th century. Id. at 174–
75 & nn.333 & 335 (discussing 19th century cases refusing to recognize limited partnerships and 
the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Partnership Act (1916) to address these difficulties). 
Primarily due to uncertainty in the statute (although UPA–16 §7 states limited partners are not 
liable unless they took part in the control of the business, it did not define control) and difficulty 
being classified as a partnership for tax purposes, the limited partnership did not emerge as a 
frequently used business organization until after 1960. See Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 
1504–08. 
 88. Hamill, A Possible Choice, supra note 1, at 721–23; Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 
1460. 
 89. See Hamill, Partnership Classification Regulation, supra note 3, at 574–78 (explaining 
that limited partnerships formed as syndicated tax shelters proliferated in the 1970s and early 
1980s and were not curtailed until the passive activity loss restrictions were enacted as part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986); Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1512–17 (describing the limited 
partnership as emerging as the preferred choice of business for oil and gas exploration and other 
syndicated business ventures); Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 306–08. 
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partner, and the statutes provided safe harbors allowing limited partners to be 
involved in the business without losing their limited partner status.90 Closely 
held corporations were the business entity of choice for many small businesses 
that would otherwise operate as general partnerships. 
After first reminding the class that this would not have been possible if the 
early twentieth century movement to move corporations from state to 
congressional control had been successful, I highlight the colorful story behind 
a group of independent oil explorers inventing the first LLC statute in the 
1970s and their frustrating fight to have LLCs taxed as partnerships.91 After 
partnership taxation was finally recognized in 1988, states slowly started to 
pass LLC statutes.92 
In 1991, Texas invented the first limited liability partnership (LLP) as an 
option for professionals to avoid draconian personal liability for their partners’ 
negligence.93 Unlike LLCs, which have their own statute, LLPs merely offer a 
registration procedure for general partnerships, which erects the corporate veil 
around all the general partners.94 Stated more plainly, I emphasize to the 
students that because LLPs are nothing more than general partnerships with the 
corporate veil, LLPs are identical to general partnerships when dealing with 
business issues unrelated to liability exposure for the business’ debts.95 
For the rest of the 1990s, LLCs and LLPs swept across the country. By 
1996 and 1999, respectively, all fifty states had passed LLC statutes and 
allowed for LLP registrations. The limited liability limited partnership (LLLP), 
a registration procedure in the limited partnership statute erecting the corporate 
veil around the general partner, also joined this hodgepodge of unincorporated 
business organizations.96 I describe the LLC movement both in the 1970s and 
the 1990s as “showing a high degree of intensity and commitment normally 
found only in movements for social change,” and then I conclude that because 
 
 90. Supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 91. Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1463–69; Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 298–99. 
 92. Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1469–76; Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 296–97. 
 93. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth 
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1073–74 (1995); see also O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra 
note 4, at 139–47 (covering Dow v. Jones, 311 F. Supp. 2d 461 (D. Md. 2004) (finding that 
provisions applicable to general partnerships regarding agency law and dissolutions apply to a 
law firm organized as a LLP)). 
 94. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 139–47. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT prefatory note (2001) (noting that amendments to the limited 
partnership statute provide an option for LLLP registration and confer a limited liability shield for 
limited partners regardless of the degree they control the business and whether an LLLP 
registration has been made); Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1475–78; Stover & Hamill, supra 
note 3, at 815–16. 
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the well-developed limited partnership could have easily been used, “the rise 
of the LLC resulted from sparks of unpredictable human creativity.”97 
My goal in Sub-Unit B, “Business Characteristics of LLCs Compared to 
Partnerships and Corporations,” is to get the students comfortable with the 
legal structure behind the statutory provisions of LLCs. Basically, LLCs are a 
hybrid between corporations and partnerships. The balance between corporate 
and partnership characteristics in LLCs varies substantially among the states. I 
tell the students that the key to understanding LLCs is recognizing the 
particular statutory provision or business law analysis necessary to resolve the 
issue as either corporate or partnership in nature. I emphasize that this sub-unit 
merely provides contours of this big picture—LLC statutes are not uniform, 
and the law surrounding LLCs is evolving more rapidly than that of 
corporations and partnerships. 
I start with the simplest picture of the LLC’s management structure and the 
typical fiduciary duties set forth in statutory defaults. If the parties fail to 
appoint managers or otherwise confine management power in a group that does 
not include all the members, the LLC is member-managed, with the members 
usually treated like general partners as far as agency powers and fiduciary 
duties. On the surface, from this perspective, which I call an “airplane view,” 
simple and relatively informal member-managed LLCs deceptively resemble 
LLPs. If managers are appointed and members are passive investors, 
management is centralized, similar to a traditional limited partnership or 
corporation; only the managers have agency powers and owe fiduciary 
duties.98 In order to introduce the endless varieties of governance structures 
that can be fashioned in the operating agreement between these two extremes, I 
present a hypothetical of a closely held and a widely held LLC and discuss 
how management authority created by the operating agreement affects the 
power to bind under agency law and the scope of fiduciary duties.99 
 
 97. Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 300, 309. 
 98. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 531–34, 584–89 (covering VGS, Inc. v. 
Castiel, No. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) 
(finding that two managers of a Delaware LLC breached their duty of loyalty when they secretly 
merged the LLC into a Delaware corporation under facts that stripped the third member/manager 
from his control of the LLC)). See also ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-4.07, 10A-5A-4.08 (2010) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2015) (noting that fiduciary duties of loyalty and care are owed by those who 
manage the LLC). 
 99. See Boles & Hamill, supra note 3, at 154–71 (contrasting Mom and Pop Grocery Store 
LLC that has five members, two of which are managers, and John Doe’s Cattle Farm LLC that 
has fifty members, two of which are managers). The discussion in this article exploring the degree 
to which a member granted authority by the operating agreement becomes a general or special 
agent, while owing more expansive or limited fiduciary duties, is still helpful even though in 
1996 when this article was published, managers had to be identified in the articles and the statute 
did not address fiduciary duties. See ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5-3.03 (repealed 2014), 10A-5A-4.07 
(effective Jan. 1, 2015), 10A-5A-4.08 (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (power to bind LLC is determined 
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I then examine the effects of the liability shield in LLCs and LLPs more 
closely. The standard for piercing the “corporate veil” of LLCs as well as LLPs 
is no different than the standard applicable to corporations.100 The liability 
shield of LLCs, as well as LLPs, limits potential losses to the contributions 
made, thereby protecting service contributors from having to bear a portion of 
a capital contributor’s loss.101 I tell the students that although the default rule 
for sharing profits and distributions in LLCs varies across the states, if the LLC 
statute adopts the partnership route and recognizes oral agreements, the need to 
use the default is rare because even informal business participants almost 
always discuss how they will share profits and distributions.102 However, 
service contributors relying on oral agreements face a bad result if the LLC 
statute requires the agreement to be in writing and if the default provision 
allocates profits based on unreturned capital.103 
I move into a closer examination of fiduciary duties, more specifically the 
circumstances they can be eliminated in a LLC. Unlike partnership statutes, 
which put the greatest restrictions on limiting the duties of loyalty and care, 
and corporate statutes, which carve the duty of loyalty and good faith outside 
the reach of exculpatory provisions, LLCs are evolving to permit almost 
 
by the law of agency; the operating agreement determines who directs and oversees the LLC and 
they owe fiduciary duties; if the operating agreement fails to spell out who directs and oversees 
the LLC, the members assume such powers and owe fiduciary duties). 
 100. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 650–55 (covering Kaycee Land and 
Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323 (Wy. 2002)). Although LLP statutes often state that partners 
are liable for their own negligence and the negligence of those they supervise and control, 
especially in the professional setting, this does not expand personal liability exposure to be any 
greater than what it would be in a LLC or professional corporation. Id. at 655 n.2. See also ALA. 
CODE § 10A-5A-8.01 (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (providing that there are special rules for LLCs that 
render professional services and providing that liability for negligence is the same as it would be 
for a sole proprietor). 
 101. See ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-3.01, -9-3.03 (effective Jan. 1, 2015). See Hamill, Story, 
supra note 3, at 314 (noting that some jurisdictions, including Alabama, apply the default 
provision for sharing losses strictly in general partnerships that are not LLPs and force service 
contributors to bear part of the capital contributor’s loss). 
 102. See ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-1.02(k), -4.05(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (allowing for oral 
or implied agreements in most situations, including profit and distribution ratio and providing that 
if they fail to agree, the statutory default mandates they share distributions equally). 
 103. See Stover & Hamill, supra note 3, at 834–38, 841–44 (describing the peril of service 
contributors under Alabama’s LLC law before the 2014 amendments, which had a default profit 
sharing ratio reflecting unreturned capital and required written agreements). The combination of 
the default, following unreturned capital (which will show little or no amount until services are 
performed and profits are allocated) and the writing requirement, arguably allocates little or no 
profits to service contributors relying on oral agreements. Although this trap has been eliminated 
from Alabama LLCs, I point this out to the students because the same trap probably exists in 
other states. 
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unlimited freedom of contract in this area.104 Alabama’s 2014 amendments to 
its LLC law expresses a policy “to give maximum effect to the principles of 
freedom of contract” and explicitly allows for the elimination of fiduciary 
duties by written agreement, but it also forbids elimination of the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.105 
Delaware expresses similar contract-favored policy and allows for the 
elimination of fiduciary duties as long as the agreement is clear.106 If the 
agreement is clear, Delaware LLCs have a greater ability to limit the scope of 
fiduciary duties than Delaware corporations. That creates an incongruous 
situation—managers in the small but growing number of publicly traded LLCs 
enjoy even less scrutiny than directors of publicly traded Delaware 
corporations.107 
I complete Sub-Unit B with dissociation, dissolution, and buyouts in 
LLCs. Primarily to comply with the partnership classification regulations, the 
first generation LLC statutes provided dissociation rights and dissolution 
triggers that mirrored the Uniform Partnership Act, causing LLCs to strongly 
resemble partnerships.108 Once those regulations were repealed, most LLC 
statutes were amended to eliminate both dissolution triggers by voluntary 
withdrawal and rights to dissociate and be bought out, thus causing LLCs to 
strongly resemble corporations.109 LLC members seeking to plan for exit rights 
in advance through buy-sell agreements face the same risk as shareholders in 
 
 104. See, e.g., O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 568 nn.3–4. 
 105. ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-1.06(a), -1.08(b)(1)-(2), (c)(5) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
 106. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 531–34 (covering Elf Actochem N. Am., 
Inc., v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) (demonstrating that Delaware’s LLC policy is to 
maximize freedom of contract)); id. at 552–67 (covering Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. 
Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) and Kahn v. 
Portnoy, No. 3515-CC, 2008 WL 5197164 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008) (finding that litigation 
claiming fiduciary duty breaches was allowed to go forward because an ambiguous agreement did 
not clearly eliminate fiduciary duties)). 
 107. Id. at 567 n.2 (noting that an exculpatory clause of a corporation providing that 
interested directors were to be treated as disinterested for purposes of finding the conflict of 
interest provisions was void under Delaware corporate law but would be permissible under the 
Delaware limited liability company act); id. at 568 nn.3–4 (noting that an exculpatory provision 
of a Delaware LLC eliminated all fiduciary duties “except in the case of fraudulent or illegal 
conduct” and resulted in dismissal of a complaint alleging related party transactions and misuse 
of funds (quoting Wood v. Buam, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2007))). 
 108. See Hamill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1469–84; Hamill, Partnership Classification 
Regulation, supra note 3, at 589–98; Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 299–303. 
 109. See Hamill, A Possible Choice, supra note 1, at 724–40 (noting that Wyoming and 
Florida LLC statutes ensured that LLCs lacked free transferability of interests and continuity of 
life and ensured they were to be taxed as partnerships). See also Farrar & Hamill, supra note 3, at 
934–38 (finding that after partnership taxation became automatic, states in mass eliminated 
dissociation rights in the LLC statute primarily to make LLCs more attractive for estate and gift 
tax planning). 
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corporations: a poorly drafted agreement will force a buy-out at less than fair 
market value.110 
If there is no buy-sell agreement, disgruntled LLC members must seek 
judicial dissolution or argue some form of common law breach of fiduciary 
duty applicable to closely held corporations.111 Some states provide LLC 
members a judicial dissolution remedy on grounds of oppression, similar to 
model-act-leaning corporations; others, including Delaware and Alabama, 
provide more limited grounds, requiring the disgruntled member to show that it 
is not reasonably practical to carry on the business under the operating 
agreement.112 In Delaware, the right to seek judicial dissolution on grounds 
that it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business can be contractually 
eliminated.113 Other states, including Alabama, do not permit such waivers in 
LLCs, and model-act-leaning states do not permit such waivers in 
corporations.114 
In Sub-Unit C, “Policy Issues Revealed by the Rise in LLCs,” I conclude 
by highlighting areas where the business organization law contains material 
differences for substantively similar businesses. I start by returning to the 
publicly traded corporation. Delaware corporate law forbids exculpating duty 
of loyalty breaches, yet Delaware LLCs can render conflicts of interests and 
other conduct that stops short of being fraudulent or illegal immune to 
challenge.115 Especially given the developments after Smith v. Van Gorkom 
and the facts of the Disney cases, reasonable minds can disagree as to whether 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty law has become too permissive for corporations. 
 
 110. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 542–52 (covering Olson v. Halvorsen, 
No. 1884-VCL, 2009 WL 1317148 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2009) (holding that a buy-out agreement of 
a Delaware LLC that limited price to accrued compensation and balance of capital account was to 
be specifically enforced and thus deprived a founding member of his fair market value equity 
interest in the LLC after he was forced out)). 
 111. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. LLC members arguing a closely held 
corporation style breach of fiduciary duty will face an uphill climb. This remedy will be denied if 
fiduciary duties have been validly waived by the operating agreement. Even absent this waiver, 
such a remedy must exist under that state’s law for close corporations and the court must be 
willing to apply that remedy to LLCs. 
 112. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 568–76 (covering Fisk Ventures, LLC v. 
Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009) (ordering a judicial dissolution of 
a Delaware LLC because deadlock made carrying on the business not reasonably practical)). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 576–84 (covering R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 
3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (specifically enforcing contractual waiver 
of judicial dissolution rights)). See also ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-1.08(c)(11) (2010) (effective Jan. 
1, 2015) (providing that an operating agreement cannot eliminate the right to petition for judicial 
dissolution on grounds that it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business); id. § 10A-2-
8.31 (forbidding the removal of remedies for oppression from jurisdiction of the courts). 
 115. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 576–84. 
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However, it makes no sense to allow publicly traded LLCs to enjoy wider 
latitude in their exculpatory clauses than corporations. The substantive 
characteristics and concerns surrounding publicly traded entities are the same 
regardless of whether the business organization is a corporation or an LLC. 
Consequently, the law defining the minimum fiduciary duties should also be 
the same.116 
I then show the students that the distinctions between business 
organization forms and the pitfalls faced by smaller, less formal businesses, 
whose participants either cannot afford, or for other reasons do not seek, 
expensive sophisticated advice, is especially insidious. By keeping dissociation 
rights immutably in the statute and limiting the ability to contractually reduce 
fiduciary duties, I have argued that partnerships registering to be LLPs offer 
the best alternative for these types of businesses, especially if automatic 
dissolution caused by a voluntary withdrawal is eliminated in the partnership 
agreement.117 
If the business incorporates, participants finding themselves trapped in a 
minority position must either rely on a buy-sell agreement, which is difficult to 
properly draft without spending substantial time and effort, or rely on judicial 
dissolution remedies or common law fiduciary duties, which cannot be 
eliminated by a contract or by an exculpatory clause. Moreover, the 
participants will have to deal with the less desirable and sometimes extremely 
detrimental tax treatment of corporations and shareholders.118 
If the participants form an LLC, which has become the most frequently 
chosen business organization, they receive partnership taxation but at a steep 
price. They not only face all the perils of close corporations, as far as no 
statutory dissociation rights, but, depending on the state, they have less 
fiduciary duty protections and judicial dissolution remedies than would be 
present in the corporate form.119 For example, Alabama corporations grant 
judicial dissolution remedies for oppression, which focuses on the plight of the 
minority shareholder; Alabama LLCs, however, limit such remedy to not being 
able to reasonably carry on the business, which focuses on the ability to make 
business decisions and therefore is arguably only available in cases of 
 
 116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 3, at 929–34 (arguing for partnership model in LLC 
defaults); Stover & Hamill, supra note 3, at 841 (noting that LLPs are better practical choice for 
smaller, less formal businesses); id. at 830–31 (finding that the dissolution trigger for voluntary 
withdrawals in at-will general partners is preserved in the default to foster cutting off personal 
liability exposure; because LLPs erect the corporate veil the dissolution trigger should be 
eliminated in the partnership agreement, thereby only allowing the dissociating member buy-out 
rights, which will prevent partners from abusing the power to dissolve). 
 118. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 119. Stover & Hamill, supra note 3, at 831–32. 
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deadlock.120 There is no good policy argument for according minority 
members of LLCs weaker remedies than minority shareholders of 
corporations.121 
For years, commentators have criticized the morass of business 
organization choices as being confusing and inefficient and have proposed 
various forms of unified business organization laws that streamline all these 
choices.122 I assign students selected reading from an article published in 
2004.123 In addition to proposing that essential provisions for all business 
organizations be harmonized as the “hub,” while maintaining necessary 
distinctive elements in “spoke” sections, it summarizes earlier articles, 
especially two in the 1990s, which floated other proposals.124 
I make sure the students understand that the rise of the LLC did not cause 
this mess—it only illuminates it. Years before the LLC was invented, 
commentators were grousing about this less than optimal situation.125 When I 
contributed “The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Feature of a Flawed 
Business Structure” to Business Tax Stories in 2005, after confessing that for 
many years I enthusiastically endorsed LLCs because they allowed small 
informal businesses a more cost-effective route to achieve limited liability and 
partnership taxation, I concluded that “the business and tax worlds are no 
better off but are also no worse off as a result of LLCs joining the mainstream 
of business organization choices.”126 That was before Delaware led the charge 
towards granting LLCs the ability to totally eliminate fiduciary duties and 
rights to judicial dissolution. Since then, the world of business law has evolved 
to be more arbitrary and therefore even more treacherous for those who cannot 
afford or for other reasons do not seek expensive legal advice. 
Although it would be easy to blame LLCs, especially Delaware LLCs, for 
this latest evolution of business law, doing so ultimately represents a simplistic 
 
 120. Id. at 832. 
 121. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. See also ALA. CODE § 10A-2-
14.30(2)(ii) (2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (providing that grounds for judicial dissolution of 
corporations includes oppression); id. § 10A-5A-7.01(d) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (providing that 
grounds for judicial dissolution of LLCs must show it is not reasonably practical to carry on the 
LLC’s business). 
 122. Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organization Code: The Next Generation, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83 (2004). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. See also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, A Call for a Unified Business 
Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996); Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, 
What’s in a Name?: An Argument for a Small Business “Limited Liability Entity” Statute (With 
Three Subsets of Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 104 (1997). 
 125. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal Structure, 33 
BUS. LAW. 849, 849, 854 (1978); Robert A. Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a 
Partnership Corporation?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 237 (1967). 
 126. See Hamill, Story, supra note 3, at 314–15. 
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view which avoids the root of the problem. I conclude the course with the 
observation I started with—business organizations, despite being a 
quintessential example of interstate commerce at its foundation, are creatures 
of state law. Not only did this historical development saddle us with the 
complexity of state and federal law occupying separate spheres, it fostered the 
messy cross-currents of multiple business organizations and inconsistent law 
produced by the creativity of fifty state legislatures and the committees of 
business lawyers advising them. Whether or not business organizations law 
would be better or worse off if it conformed to other areas of interstate 
commerce and was only a matter of federal law is a matter of personal opinion 
and ultimately a futile academic exercise. No serious movement to federalize 
the law of business organizations has occurred since the early twentieth 
century, probably because it would fail. States’ rights and all the consequences 
flowing from it has prevailed and dominates the law of business organizations. 
H. Final Comments on the Joy of Teaching Business Organizations 
In addition to Business Organizations, I also teach Personal Income Tax, 
Business Tax, and a seminar in the Honors College for undergraduate seniors. I 
have taught in the past a seminar in business ethics, an advanced course 
focusing on special business and tax problems with LLCs, State and Local 
Tax, Corporate Finance, and Securities Regulation. Especially over the past ten 
years, I have often taught Business Organizations and Personal Income Tax in 
the same semester and joke that, although I love both classes and would never 
want to give either of them up, covering them at the same time is kind of like 
having chocolate and butterscotch for dessert. 
Sometimes, when I interview candidates for faculty appointments, I ask 
them which class is their favorite to teach. Over the years when contemplating 
that question for myself, I vacillated between Personal Income Tax, which I 
affectionately nickname “Baby Tax” because that is what my tax teacher, 
Professor Bob Peroni (now at Texas, then at Tulane) called it, and Business 
Organizations. Although it is close call, I can say with certainty that my 
favorite law school class is Business Organizations. 
Despite all the challenges posed from dealing with multiple state laws, 
which are not present in a federal income tax class, at its core, business law is 
about fostering the creation of new wealth. If the laws are equitable, while 
allowing for risk and innovation, more wealth will be created, which will 
ultimately uplift everyone, especially those who are among the least in our 
society. In my tax scholarship, which I highlight at end of my Personal Income 
Tax class, I vigorously take the position on moral grounds that fair taxation, 
which requires the burden to be apportioned under a moderately progressive 
model and adequate revenues raised to support the reasonable opportunity of 
every person to reach his or her potential, is an integral part of making sure 
everyone has a chance to participate in the grand pursuit of creating new 
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wealth.127 Without the companion of these attributes of morally sound fair 
taxation, the future potential of creating new wealth will be jeopardized no 
matter how sound the business organizations laws are. For that reason, when 
identifying my favorite scholarship, I gravitate to the tax side. In the end 
though, what makes or breaks the experience in the classroom for the students, 
and also for the professor, is not the professor’s scholarship but good stories. 
When it comes to producing good stories, Business Organizations trumps 
Personal Income Tax hands down. 
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